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COMMENTARY
US Federal Climate Change Law in
Obama’s Second Term†
Michael B. Gerrard* and Shelley Welton**

Abstract
This commentary details the United States’ progress in advancing climate change law since
President Barrack Obama’s re-election in 2012, in spite of congressional dysfunction and
opposition. It describes how the Obama administration is building upon earlier regulatory
efforts by using existing statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from both
new and existing power plants. It also explains the important role the judiciary has played in
facilitating more robust executive actions, while at the same time courts have rejected citizen
efforts to force judicial remedies for the problem of climate change. Finally, it suggests some
reasons why climate change has gained more prominence in the Obama administration’s
second term agenda and considers how domestic actions help the United States to reposition
itself in international climate diplomacy.
Keywords: Climate Change, United States, Obama Administration, Executive Action,
Regulation, Climate Diplomacy

1.

introduction

In the 2012 United States (US) presidential election, the term ‘climate change’ went
virtually unmentioned because it had become politically unmentionable. After a longawaited federal cap-and-trade bill narrowly failed to pass through Congress in 2010,
climate change policy advocates in the US struggled to see a path forward on domestic
action. Similarly, leaders around the world faced the conundrum of how to make
international climate progress without buy-in from the historically largest emitter.
Now, more than a year after President Barack Obama’s re-election, the situation
looks decidedly less grim, although not exactly rosy. As he began his second term,
This contribution is part of a collection of articles growing out of the conference ‘Global Climate Change
Without the United States: Thinking the Unthinkable’, held at Yale University Law School, New Haven,
CT (United States), 9–10 Nov. 2012.
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President Obama made clear that ‘climate change’ was no longer unmentionable and,
in fact, would become a policy priority. Indeed, the US played a more constructive role
in the international climate negotiations in Warsaw (Poland) in November 2013,1
prompting one reporter to ask in a headline, ‘Is America no longer public enemy No. 1
on climate change?’.2
This commentary details the progress made in advancing climate change law
in the US since Obama’s re-election, in spite of congressional dysfunction and
opposition. Building on ﬁrst-term regulatory efforts, the Obama administration has
ﬁnally committed to using existing statutory authority to perhaps its fullest extent
to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from both new and existing power
plants. The judicial branch has largely accepted executive use of the Clean Air Act
(CAA)3 to regulate GHGs, even though the Act proves in many ways to be a clunky
vehicle for regulating a globally dispersed pollutant.4 Together, these domestic
actions have given new credibility to US climate diplomacy.5
To have ceded the position as the world’s most reviled polluter is hardly an
accomplishment to boast about. Yet, in its second term, the Obama administration
has shown signiﬁcant initiative on an issue that remains politically fraught. We suggest
a few reasons for this progress: a second-term presidency coupled with a gridlocked
Congress has provided an opening for bold executive action; a domestic ‘shale gas
revolution’ has expanded the conversation about future energy options;6 state actions
have put the lie to the argument that climate regulation is economically ruinous; and
multiple disasters have served as reminders that climate change will prove to be
immensely damaging to the US and the rest of the world.

1
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19th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, 11–22 Nov. 2013, Warsaw (Poland),
available at: http://www.cop19.gov.pl. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int.
See L. Friedman, ‘Is America No Longer Public Enemy No. 1 on Climate Change?’, E&E Reporting,
21 Nov. 2013, available at: http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059990838.
42 U.S.C. x 7401 et seq. (2012)
Most scholars and advocates take the view that comprehensive federal climate legislation, whether
in the form of a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade system, or something else, would be a superior method
of regulating climate change both in terms of efﬁciency and effectiveness. Such legislation, however,
remains politically untenable for the foreseeable future: see, e.g., N. Richardson, A. Fraas &
D. Burtraw, ‘Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and
Implications of a Knowable Pathway’ (2011) 41 Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis,
pp. 10098–120, at 10098 (presenting a CAA approach to regulating GHG emissions as an inferior
but realistic option).
See, e.g., US Submission on the 2015 Agreement, UNFCCC Party Submissions in Advance of the 19th
Conference of the Parties (2013), at p. 1, available at: http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/documentation/submissions_
from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_usa_workstream_1_20131017.pdf (‘The United States is committed
to playing a leadership role on climate change . President Obama recently announced the US Climate
Action Plan, which contains a broad range of actions to enhance US efforts toward our 2020 mitigation
commitment and beyond’).
See, e.g., David Brooks, ‘Shale Gas Revolution’, The New York Times, 3 Nov. 2011, at A31; Breakthrough
Institute, ‘Where the Shale Gas Revolution Came From: Government’s Role in the Development of
Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale’, May 2012, available at: http://thebreakthrough.org/images/main_image/
Where_the_Shale_Gas_Revolution_Came_From2.pdf.
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executive action on climate change

In his January 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama challenged Congress
to end its inaction in the face of climate change, promising that ‘if Congress won’t act
soon to protect future generations, I will’.7 This speech marked a turning point in the
administration’s commitment to addressing climate change through whatever means
necessary.
It is not as though the Obama administration had done nothing on climate change
up to that point; quite the opposite. Although the public failure of the cap-and-trade
bill and lacklustre progress at the 2009 international negotiations in Copenhagen
(Denmark)8 dominated the news, the ﬁrst-term administration was able to advance
climate change policy in several important respects, using executive tools. Firstly, the
US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2009 Endangerment Finding ofﬁcially
conﬁrmed that GHGs endanger public health and welfare and should therefore be
regulated under the CAA.9 This ﬁnding paved the way for regulating GHG emissions
from vehicles, culminating in an August 2012 rulemaking that raised fuel efﬁciency
standards for light vehicles from 29.7 miles per gallon to 54.5 miles per gallon by
2025.10 The administration projects that this increase will ‘reduce emissions by 6 billion
metric tons over the life of the program – more than the total amount of carbon dioxide
[CO2] emitted by the United States in 2010’.11 Also in Obama’s ﬁrst term, the EPA issued
its 2010 Tailoring Rule, making possible certain stationary source GHG regulations;12
the Securities and Exchange Commission issued guidance on climate risk disclosure
requirements;13 the Council on Environmental Quality provided draft guidance for
considering climate change under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA);14
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President Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address’ 12 Feb. 2013, available
at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address.
15th session of the COP-UNFCCC, 7–18 Dec. 2009, Copenhagen (Denmark), available at:
https://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/meeting/6295.php.
EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202
(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (15 Dec. 2009), see also: http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/endangerment.
See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (15 Oct. 2012) (codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 100),
see also: http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regs-light-duty.htm.
White House Press Release, ‘Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efﬁciency
Standards’, 28 Aug. 2012, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2012/08/28/obamaadministration-ﬁnalizes-historic-545-mpg-fuel-efﬁciency-standard.
75 Fed. Reg. 31,516 (3 June 2010). The Tailoring Rule set limits on the stationary sources required to
comply with certain GHG regulations, so as to avoid absurd results and regulatory overburdening by
bringing over 6 million small sources under the EPA’s permitting authority on the basis of carbon
emissions alone: ibid., at 31,554; see also: http://www.epa.gov/nsr/actions.html#may10.
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (8 Feb. 2010)
(codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231 and 241), see also: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm.
Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, Council on Environmental Quality, to Heads of Federal
Departments & Agencies on Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 18 Feb. 2010, available at: http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_
Effects_of_GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_02182010.pdf.
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and the Department of Energy established new energy efﬁciency standards for household
appliances.15
As meaningful as these actions were, climate change policy was not the centrepiece
of Obama’s ﬁrst term. Thus, the bolder tone struck in the 2013 State of the Union
address signalled a change in policy priorities. Obama made these promises more
concrete ﬁve months later, in June 2013, by releasing a Climate Action Plan in a major
speech devoted exclusively to the topic of climate.16 The plan, key portions of which
are described below, set an ambitious agenda for Obama’s remaining time in ofﬁce.

2.1. Power Plant Regulation
One key element of the Climate Action Plan is regulation of the power sector – the
largest source of GHG emissions in the US.17 The most prominent action taken so far
by the EPA in this regard is a revised proposal to control GHGs from new power
plants, under the agency’s CAA authority to establish ‘standards of performance’
for new sources.18 The new proposal, issued on 20 September 2013, establishes two
separate standards: the ﬁrst limits GHG emissions from new natural gas-ﬁred plants
while the second, slightly less stringent, standard applies to new coal-ﬁred plants.19
Modern combined-cycle natural gas plants meet the proposed standards, but coal plants
cannot unless they employ carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), a method of
capturing GHGs and piping them to long-term underground storage reservoirs, or using
them for enhanced oil recovery.20 Though billions of dollars have been spent on
developing and commercializing CCS technology, no such units involving both capture
and storage have been put into commercial operation at coal-ﬁred power plants. The
proposed rule thus seems to place an effective ban on the construction of new coal plants.
However, its impacts would, in fact, be limited, as few if any new coal-ﬁred plants are
planned in the US because of the low price of natural gas, the expense of complying with
several new and potential regulations, and the declining demand for electricity.21

15

16

17

18
19

20

21

Direct Final Rule Regarding Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Dishwashers, 77 Fed.
Reg. 31,918 (30 May 2012), see also: http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/
product.aspx/productid/67.
Executive Ofﬁce of the President, ‘The President’s Climate Action Plan’, June 2013, available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
EPA, ‘National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data’, available at: http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html (last visited 11 Dec. 2013).
CAA x 111(b); codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. x 7411(b) (2012).
Proposed Rule, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, Rulemaking No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495 (20 Sept. 2013), 79 Fed.
Reg. 1352 (8 Jan. 2014, available at: http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/2013-proposedcarbon-pollution-standard-new-power-plants.
See generally ‘Carbon Capture and Sequestration Technologies’, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
available at: http://sequestration.mit.edu/index.html; A.B. Klass & E.J. Wilson, ‘Climate Change,
Carbon Sequestration, and Property Rights’ (2010) 30(2) University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 363–428.
The rule remains in proposal form for now. President Obama has directed the EPA to ﬁnalize this
rule ‘in a timely fashion’: see Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 25 June 2013 (Memorandum for EPA), at p. 2,
available at: http://tiny.cc/EPA-Memo.

Michael Gerrard and Shelley Welton

5

Of much greater environmental signiﬁcance, the Climate Action Plan also calls for
GHG emission standards for existing power plants. As a result of the ‘grandfathering’
rules, hundreds of coal-ﬁred plants constructed in the 1950s and 1960s still operate
with minimal air pollution controls.22 Regulating the GHG emissions of these plants is
both critical and complicated. While the EPA has direct authority over new plants
under CAA section 111(b), a different section (111(d)) applies to existing plants.23 This
section calls on the EPA to set guidelines, but allows each state to design its own
standards of performance and implementation plan.24 EPA guidelines may vary from
one state to another, depending on each state’s mix of fuels and generation resources.
It is also possible that the EPA will employ a variety of legal theories to use CAA section
111(d) to permit multi-state emissions trading systems. All of this is sure to generate
considerable litigation, considering the high stakes of such regulations. Moreover,
while the EPA has ample experience in designing standards for new plants, the provisions
of CAA section 111(d) for existing plants have rarely been used.
President Obama has directed the EPA to propose guidelines for existing plants by
1 June 2014; to ﬁnalize them by 1 June 2015; and to give states until 30 June 2016 to
submit their implementation plans.25 Even if this ambitious timeline is met, by the time
states submit their plans, the President will have less than seven months remaining in
ofﬁce and the inevitable implementation challenges and litigation will play out under
his successor. Regulations for existing power plants might therefore be both the most
essential and the most fragile element of Obama’s climate agenda.

2.2. Beyond Power Plants
The second-term Obama administration is also looking beyond the CAA to reduce
GHGs. Shortly before releasing the Climate Action Plan, the administration quietly
used an energy efﬁciency update for microwaves to announce an updated ‘social cost
of carbon’ (SCC) calculation.26 The SCC is ‘an estimate of the monetized damages
associated with an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year’, and
includes changes in agricultural productivity, human health, property damage, and the
value of ecosystem services.27 The June 2013 update changed the central SCC estimate
from $22 to $36 for a metric ton of CO2 emitted in 2013.28 Agencies use SCC estimates
22

23
24
25
26

27
28

See generally J.R. Nash & R.L. Revesz, ‘Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law
and Economics of New Source Review’ (2007) 101 Northwestern University Law Review, pp.
1677–733, at 1681–96.
CAA x 111(d); codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. x 7411(d) (2012).
Ibid.
See Memorandum for EPA, n. 21 above.
Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Standby Mode and Off Mode for
Microwave Ovens, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,316, 36,318 (17 June 2013) (to be codiﬁed at 10 C.F.R. pts. 429 and
430). Although announced in this rulemaking, an interagency working group actually formulated the
updated SCC, and explained its methodology in a technical report dated May 2013: see Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, ‘Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for
Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866’, May 2013 (Technical Update), available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/omb/inforeg/social_cost_of_carbon_for_ria_2013_update.pdf.
Technical Update, ibid., at p. 2.
Ibid., at p. 18.
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in assessing the costs and beneﬁts of potential regulations, as required in an
executive order issued by President Bill Clinton.29 A higher SCC should make
more regulations limiting carbon appear cost-effective. 30 Perhaps unsurprisingly
then, the SCC’s revision has become something of a ﬂashpoint, with critics
suggesting it is really just a hidden carbon tax that was adopted undemocratically.31
In November 2013, the White House announced that it will seek new public comment
on the revised standards.32
Media coverage of Obama’s second-term climate agenda has been dominated by
another fossil fuel-related issue: the pending decision on the Keystone XL pipeline, which
would transport oil from the Canadian tar sands to the US Gulf Coast. The proposed
project requires a permit from the State Department, which must determine whether the
pipeline would ‘serve the national interest’.33 Climate activists have worked to cast the
Keystone XL decision as a symbolic component of Obama’s climate legacy, suggesting
that a decision to proceed would lock in a future of high-polluting oil.34 Although the
administration has remained generally close-lipped about its decision-making on
Keystone XL, Obama’s June 2013 speech vowed that the pipeline would be approved
only if it ‘does not signiﬁcantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution’.35 Both
sides declared that this meant they would be victorious, thus reﬂecting far different
ways of seeing the issue.36
Looking forward, the Climate Action Plan sets out a number of additional steps that
the Obama administration plans to take to reduce GHG emissions. These include:
 expanding the use of renewable energy;
 accelerating transmission development on public lands;
 better regulating hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs) and methane, extremely potent
GHGs;

29

30

31

32

33
34

35

36

See Executive Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (4 Oct. 1993); see also Executive Order No.
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (21 Jan. 2011) (Obama executive order ‘reafﬁrm[ing] the principles,
structures, and deﬁnitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive
Order 12866 of September 30, 1993’).
For example, the microwave efﬁciency standards’ net beneﬁts increased from $4.2 billion to $4.6 billion
with the new social cost of carbon estimates applied: see Energy Conservation Standards for Microwave
Ovens, 78 Fed. Reg. at 36,318.
See B. Lieberman, ‘Social Costs of Carbon: A Continuing Little-Told Story’, Yale Forum on Climate
Change & the Media, 12 Sept. 2013, available at: http://www.yaleclimatemediaforum.org/2013/09/sccsocial-costs-of-carbon-a-continuing-little-told-story.
Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, ‘Reﬁning Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon’, 1 Nov. 2011,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/11/01/reﬁning-estimates-social-cost-carbon.
See Executive Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299 (30 Apr. 2004).
See, e.g., B. McKibben, ‘Will Obama Block the Keystone Pipeline or Just Keep Bending?’, Hufﬁngton
Post, 28 Oct. 2013, available at: http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/bill-mckibben/obama-keystone-xlpipeline_b_4169791.html (calling the decision an ‘X-ray for a ﬂagging presidency’).
Remarks by the President on Climate Change, Georgetown University, Washington, DC (US), 25 June 2013,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change.
See I. Austen, ‘In Canada, Pipeline Remarks Stir Analysis’, The New York Times, 26 June 2013 (quoting
environmentalists claiming that the remarks indicated that ‘the pipeline will be rejected’, while industry
representatives interpreted the remarks as ‘a positive step in the process’), available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/06/27/business/energy-environment/in-canada-pipeline-remarks-stir-analysis.html?_r50.
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 continuing to tighten efﬁciency standards for appliances and buildings; and
 further increasing fuel economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles.37
However, the plan also recognizes that, despite all efforts to reduce GHG emissions,
temperatures will increase and seas will rise for many years. Thus, resiliency and
adaptation receive considerable attention, with the President calling on federal
agencies to integrate resiliency into their activities.38 The plan also includes measures
to help to protect critical sectors of the economy from climate-related disasters and to
assist state and local adaptation efforts.39 President Obama followed up these pledges
with a November 2013 executive order that, among other things, directs federal
agencies to reform barriers to investing in adaptation and to identify ways in which
their policies might contribute to climate vulnerability.40

3.

the courts buy in, so far

As outlined in the previous section, the Obama administration is pursuing a relatively
ambitious set of climate initiatives, but the outcome of these initiatives will hinge, in part,
on whether they are judged to be within the bounds of executive authority. Almost every
climate regulation either has been or will be subjected to court challenge.41
By and large, the courts have, so far, upheld executive actions taken on GHGs.
This judicial acceptance of executive action on climate change has been critical of the
Obama administration’s ability to construct an increasingly robust response to climate
change without congressional support. In June 2012, the US Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs against
numerous challenges,42 including challenges to the Endangerment Finding and the
Tailoring Rule.43 This decision, considered a major victory for the EPA, has been
thrown partly into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in October 2013 to
grant certiorari.44 However, the Supreme Court limited its review to one question:
whether the EPA has permissibly determined that its decision to regulate GHGs from
motor vehicles ‘triggered’ an obligation to regulate stationary sources as well.45

37
38
39
40

41

42

43
44
45

See Climate Action Plan, n. 16 above.
Ibid., at pp. 12–3.
Ibid., at p. 13.
Executive Order, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, 1 Nov. 2013,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2013/11/01/executive-order-preparingunited-states-impacts-climate-change.
See, e.g., D. Markell & J.B. Ruhl, ‘An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?’ (2012) 64 Florida Law Review, pp. 15–86 (collecting, categorizing,
and analyzing trends in climate litigation).
Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113–4 (DC Cir., 2012) (holding the EPA’s
Endangerment Finding to be neither arbitrary nor capricious and dismissing challenges to the Tailoring
and Timing Rules for lack of standing), certiorari granted sub nom Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 418 (15 Oct. 2013).
See n. 8 above.
Coalition for Responsible Regulation, n. 42 above, at 418.
Ibid.
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Signiﬁcantly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari with respect to the EPA’s Endangerment Finding and the vehicle tailpipe emissions standards.
Directly at stake in this challenge is whether the Prevention of Signiﬁcant
Deterioration programme,46 aimed at preventing new sources from worsening local
air quality, applies to GHGs. The case does not have direct bearing on the performance
standards for new and existing fossil fuel-ﬁred power plants, as these fall under a different
part of the CAA.47 However, a decision against the EPA would reduce its ability to go
after other stationary sources and thus impede President Obama’s objective of reducing
overall GHG emissions. Oral argument in the case will take place in February 2014, with
a decision anticipated by June 2014.48
Although not directly related to climate, two other pending court challenges might
have considerable impact on future GHG emissions. In 2011, the EPA ﬁnalized two
landmark air regulations: the Mercury Air Toxics Standard (MATS) and the Cross State
Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR). MATS would reduce power plant mercury (Hg) emissions
by 90%, but at a fairly substantial cost to affected sources.49 CSAPR aims to control
sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions through a multi-state emissions
trading programme.50 Both regulations have been challenged by affected industries. The
DC Circuit heard oral argument in a challenge to MATS in December 2013.51 At the same
time, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a challenge to CSAPR, which the DC Circuit
struck out in 2012 upon ﬁnding that the EPA’s regulatory design exceeded its
authority.52 If MATS and CSAPR are upheld, the expense of complying with these
regulations is likely to accelerate the closure of some major sources of GHGs.
Additional legal challenges are all but guaranteed once the EPA ﬁnalizes its
regulations for GHGs from new and existing power plants under CAA section 111.
Key questions that are likely to be raised include whether the EPA’s emissions rate
limitations under section 111(b) for new coal plants are overly ambitious based on
current CCS technological prospects, and just what the EPA can require of existing
sources under section 111(d).53 As these pending and anticipated disputes highlight,

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

See 42 U.S.C. x 7470 et seq. (2012); US Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Prevention of Signiﬁcant
Deterioration (PSD) Basic Information’, available at: http://www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html.
Compare 42 U.S.C. x 7411 (New Source Performance Standards), with 42 U.S.C. Ch. 85,
pt. C (PSD programme).
See Supreme Court of the United States, ‘October Term 2013, Schedule for Session Beginning
February 24, 2014’, available at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/
MonthlyArgumentCalFEB%202014.pdf.
77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9305-06 (16 Feb. 2012) (estimating annual social costs at $9.6 billion, with annual
social beneﬁts between $37 and $90 billion using a 3% discount rate).
Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and
Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (8 Aug. 2011) (to be codiﬁed at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51,
52, 72, 78, and 97).
See Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, Docket No. 13-1201 (DC Cir., oral argument heard
10 Dec. 2013).
See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, Docket No. 12-1182 (US Supreme Court, oral argument
heard 10 Dec. 2013), appealing 696 F.3d 7 (DC Cir., 2012).
See 42 U.S.C. x 7411(a) (deﬁning ‘standards of performance’ as ‘a standard for emissions of air
pollutants which reﬂects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best
system of emission reduction which . has been adequately demonstrated’).
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for all its remarkable capacity to address new pollutants that pose grave new dangers
unforeseen at the time of its passage, the existing CAA is far from the ideal way to
regulate GHGs.54
In contrast to the relative success enjoyed by the EPA in legal challenges to its
GHG regulations, the courts have maintained their scepticism of citizen relief.
In addition to bringing lawsuits to force agency action, many litigants have attempted
to extend common law doctrines, including public nuisance theories and the public
trust doctrine, to harm related to climate change. These suits have met with little
success, faltering on issues of separation of powers, standing, causation, and the
practicability of judicial relief.55 The trends of expanding administrative action and
shrinking avenues for citizen relief are not independent, as forward movement on the
EPA’s regulatory agenda appears to contribute to the courts’ unwillingness to shape
piecemeal judicial remedies.56
A few important decisions in Obama’s second term have narrowed the potential
for judicially crafted solutions to climate change. In May 2013, the Supreme Court
declined to review the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of a suit by the Village of Kivalina, an
Alaskan seaside Inupiat village requiring relocation as a result of erosion from melting
ice and seeking compensation for relocation expenses.57 The Ninth Circuit held that
the regulatory authority of the CAA and the EPA displace the federal common law of
nuisance in GHGs, even for damages claims.58 Also in May 2013, the Fifth Circuit
dismissed an attempt to hold GHG emitters liable under a public nuisance theory.59
Since these cases, plaintiffs appear to be largely foreclosed from proceeding with
federal common law claims against emitters. Whether state common law claims may
be available remains an open question.60

54
55

56

57
58
59
60

See ibid. x 7401(b)(1) (Congressional Declaration of Purpose).
See generally D.A. Kysar, ‘What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law’ (2011) 41 Environmental
Law, pp. 1–71, generally and at p. 2, n. 3 (describing the difﬁculties that climate litigants face in persuading
courts to extend common law tort theories to climate damage and collecting scholarly analysis on these
issues). See also, e.g., American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (rejecting
a public nuisance claim); Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853–4
(9th Cir., 2012) (rejecting a public nuisance claim), certiorari denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013); U.S.
Legal Actions, Our Children’s Trust, available at: http://ourchildrenstrust.org/legal/US-Action
(collecting state and federal lawsuits sponsored by this organization to force regulation of carbon
emissions under the public trust doctrine – none of which have yet been successful).
Cf. American Electric Power Co., ibid., at 2537 (ﬁnding any potential federal common law claim
for abatement of GHG emissions displaced by federal legislation authorizing the EPA to regulate
these emissions).
Kivalina, n. 55 above, at 853–54.
Ibid., at 858.
See Comer v. Murphy Oil, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir., 2013).
See American Electric Power Co., n. 55 above, at 2540 (‘None of the parties have briefed preemption or
otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore leave the matter
open for consideration.’); see also Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 197
(3d Cir., 2013) (holding that ‘the Clean Air Act does not preempt state common law claims based
on the law of the state where the source of the pollution is located’, and remanding for further
proceedings). But see North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F.3d 291, 310 (4th Cir., 2010)
(holding that plants could not be public nuisances under the law of their state when in compliance with
state and federal air regulations).
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The Ninth Circuit further narrowed the possibilities for citizen relief in its October
2013 decision in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, at least if the opinion
holds up and other circuits adopt similar reasoning.61 In Bellon, two environmental
groups sought to compel the Washington Department of Ecology and two regional
clean air agencies to regulate oil reﬁneries under the CAA. The Ninth Circuit dismissed
the claim, holding that even if the plaintiffs had established injury in fact resulting from
climate change, they had not provided evidence sufﬁcient to establish the causality or
redressability elements of standing. The court noted that establishing an adequate
‘causal nexus’ between the plaintiffs’ injuries and government inaction would prove to
be particularly challenging because ‘there is limited scientiﬁc capability in assessing,
detecting, or measuring the relationship between a certain [GHG] emission source and
localized climate impacts in a given region’.62 Although the Supreme Court found in
Massachusetts v. EPA that states could overcome such standing hurdles to challenge
government inaction on GHGs,63 Bellon casts doubt on whether other entities can ever
do the same.
A decision of the DC Court in December 2013, however, was more lenient to
climate change plaintiffs on the issue of standing. In Wildearth Guardians v. Jewell,
the DC Circuit reversed a district court opinion that denied plaintiffs standing on their
claim that a federal environmental impact statement for a coal lease inadequately
considered climate change risks.64 The DC Circuit held that the harm alleged by the
plaintiffs to recreational and aesthetic interests as a result of increased local pollution
gave them standing to challenge the adequacy of the climate change analysis, even
though they could not have established standing on their climate claims alone.65
Wildearth should allow plaintiffs who can combine climate change claims with traditional
local injuries an increased chance of establishing standing, again assuming the opinion
holds up and the reasoning is adopted more broadly.
Given the primacy placed by these judicial trends on administrative action as the
appropriate locus of climate change solutions, court review of the EPA’s GHG
regulations will be of paramount importance in determining the extent to which the
US can reduce emissions in the relatively near term. With such critical questions
looming, the November 2013 decision by the Senate to eliminate ﬁlibusters blocking
certain presidential nominations may turn out to have important implications for
climate change.66 Under the new rules, which require a simple majority for conﬁrmation,
Democrats are expected more rapidly to ﬁll the almost one hundred vacancies in the
federal judiciary, including several on the DC Circuit, the court given exclusive
61

62
63
64
65
66

732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir., 2013). The Bellon plaintiffs have petitioned for en banc review: see Docket No.
12-35323 (9th Cir., en banc brieﬁng ﬁled 3 Dec. 2013). A petition for certiorari is also likely.
Ibid., at 1143.
549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007).
Docket No. 12-5300, slip op. (DC Cir., decided 24 Dec. 2013).
Ibid., at 11–12.
See P. Kane, ‘Reid, Democrats Trigger “Nuclear” Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nominees’,
The Washington Post, 21 Nov. 2013, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senatepoised-to-limit-ﬁlibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe852b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.

Michael Gerrard and Shelley Welton

11

jurisdiction over challenges to EPA regulations.67 These changes could give the EPA
a bit more leeway in its CAA interpretations.

4.

climate law drivers: the states, the changing
energy mix, and a dose of reality

What has driven Obama’s more outspoken, aggressive approach to climate change in
his second term? Part of the answer, certainly, is embedded in the question: a second-term
president’s freedom from re-election concerns can inspire bolder actions. But several other
forces have converged to make climate change gain prominence in the administration’s
second-term agenda. The ﬁrst is the refusal by Congress to consider action on any
important issues on the President’s agenda. This deadlock, while generally detrimental to
democracy and progress, also means that the President need not hold back on regulating
the politically contentious issue of climate change in an effort to move other issues
forward in Congress.
A second force driving the recent surge of climate initiatives is the so-called ‘shale
gas revolution’ in the US.68 Between 2005 and 2012, natural gas prices dropped from
a high of around $10 per million Btu to less than $3 per million Btu, largely because
a new drilling technique – hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling – unlocked
a vast quantity of reserves.69 Natural gas is now cost-competitive with coal, and
burning gas to make electricity emits approximately half the GHGs emitted by coal.70
Consequently, lower natural gas prices have driven down power sector GHG emissions
even in the absence of regulation. By showing a path forward that does not rely on
ever-elusive CCS technology, the rise of natural gas has eased the way for GHG
regulation. However, the long-term cost competitiveness of natural gas remains
uncertain.71 If coal again becomes the economical fuel choice, GHG regulations that
seem superﬂuous now (in particular, proposed emissions rate limitations on new
sources) may regain importance.
State experimentation provides a third force behind current federal climate
initiatives. In the absence of robust federal action, states have taken up climate regulation
to an impressive degree. Nine northeastern states have run a cap-and-trade programme
for CO2 from power plants since 2009, which a recent report found will create billions of

67
68
69

70

71

See 42 U.S.C. x 7607(b).
See n. 6 above.
See US Energy Information Administration, ‘Annual Energy Outlook’ (2013), at p. 76, available at:
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf.
See EPA, ‘Natural Gas’, available at: http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/
natural-gas.html. However, the production of natural gas also emits GHGs – in particular, the
potent GHG methane – in quantities that are currently the topic of much scientiﬁc debate: see,
e.g., J. Tollefson, ‘Methane Leaks Erode Green Credentials of Natural Gas’ (2013) 493(7430)
Nature, p. 12.
See US Energy Information Administration, n. 69 above, at p. 3 (‘Although coal is expected to continue
its important role in U.S. electricity generation, there are many uncertainties that could affect future
outcomes. Chief among them are the relationship between coal and natural gas prices and the potential
for policies aimed at reducing [GHG] emissions’).
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dollars in net economic beneﬁts for the region.72 California has adopted a suite of
ambitious climate policies, including a cap-and-trade system and a low carbon fuel
standard, the latter of which recently survived a critical court challenge under the
dormant commerce clause.73 Other states have adopted actions that focus less
directly on limiting carbon, but have that effect nevertheless. Twenty-nine states
now have in place mandatory Renewable Portfolio Standards, and 24 have Energy
Efﬁciency Resource Standards.74 These standards require utilities in a state to obtain
a certain percentage of their electricity from renewable sources and to attain a certain
level of energy savings annually. Collectively, these state actions demonstrate that
a majority of states want a different energy mix in the future and that climate policies
need not spell economic ruin.75
One reason why the country, if not many vocal members of Congress, may be
warming to carbon regulation is the accelerating severity of disasters both in the US
and around the world.76 While it remains difﬁcult to attribute speciﬁc weather events
to climate change, models show that these events are expected to happen with greater
frequency and severity in a warmer world. The number of weather-related natural
catastrophes in North America has risen from around 50 a year in the early 1980s
to around 200 a year,77 at an annual cost of approximately $110 billion in 2012.78
These sobering ﬁgures may help to drive home the message that climate change is likely
to be far more expensive to ﬁx than to prevent. The election-season behaviour of
New York City Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, illustrated this phenomenon: the week after
Superstorm Sandy ravaged the city in October 2012, the mayor (who was originally
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See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, available at: http://www.rggi.org; P.J. Hibbard et al.,
‘The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic
States’, Analysis Group, 15 Nov. 2011, at p. 24, available at: http://www.analysisgroup.com/
uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Economic_Impact_RGGI_Report.pdf.
See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19258 (9th Cir., 18 Sept. 2013).
See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efﬁciency, ‘RPS Data Spreadsheet’, Mar. 2013,
available at: http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata; American Council for an Energy Efﬁcient Economy,
‘Energy Efﬁciency Resource Standards’, available at: http://aceee.org/topics/eers.
Many scholars have devoted attention to the important roles that states and cities play in US climate
policy: see, e.g., R.B. Stewart, ‘States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs.
Plural Architectures’ (2008) 50 Arizona Law Review, pp. 681–707 (arguing that state efforts can and
should persist, even if a robust federal or international climate regime is adopted); H. Osofsky, ‘Diagonal
Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration’ (2011) 62 Alabama Law
Review, pp. 237–303 (discussing, inter alia, the vertical interplay among local, state, and federal climate
regulation); G.B. Pursley & H.J. Wiseman, ‘Local Energy’ (2011) 60 Emory Law Journal, pp. 877–959
(charting the role of local governments in promoting the transition to clean energy); M. Powers, ‘United
States Municipal Climate Plans: What Role Will Cities Play in Climate Change Mitigation?’, in
B.J. Richardson (ed), Local Climate Change Law: Environmental Regulation in Cities and Other
Localities (IUCN Academy of Environmental Law, 2012), pp.134–63.
See, e.g., B. Rabe & C. Borick, Continued Rebound in American Belief in Climate Change: Spring 2012
NSAPOCC Findings (Brookings Institute, 2012), at p. 2 (ﬁnding a ‘rebound in public belief in evidence
of global warming’ and ‘evidence that Americans are linking weather events and experiences to their
views on the existence of climate change’).
N.D. Israel, ‘Inaction on Climate Change: The Cost to Taxpayers’, Ceres, Oct. 2013 (internal
citation omitted), at p. 7, available at: http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/inaction-on-climatechange-the-cost-totaxpayers.
Ibid., at p. 5.
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elected as a Republican) announced a surprising last-minute endorsement of President
Obama, speciﬁcally on the grounds of climate change policy.79 It may or may not be
a coincidence that in the same week Bloomberg Businessweek printed a bright red cover
that showed a ﬂooded Manhattan street and declared, ‘It’s Global Warming, Stupid’.80

5.

a new face to the world

While this commentary has focused on US domestic federal actions, it is on the world
stage that climate change will ultimately be slowed or accelerated. Although the US
has a poor reputation from past international climate negotiations, there are recent
signals that the country is more earnestly seeking bilateral and multilateral progress,
as promised in the Climate Action Plan.81
The US and China are the two most essential players in reducing carbon emissions,
accounting together for approximately 45% of 2012 emissions.82 These nations have
historically been antagonists on climate change, with the US refusing to move forward
without China agreeing to binding emissions limitations, and China asserting that the
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ precludes this arrangement.83
However, amid intense internal discord in China over the country’s worsening air
quality, the countries’ interests in addressing climate change domestically appear to
be converging. In spring 2013, the US and China issued a Joint Statement on Climate
Change, leading to a working group that set out ﬁve (non-binding) cooperative
initiatives:
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reducing emissions from heavy-duty and other vehicles;
promoting CCS;
increasing energy efﬁciency in buildings and industry;
improving GHG data collection and management; and
promoting smart grids.84
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The countries have also agreed to work together to phase down the production and
consumption of HFCs,85 using the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer.86 These initiatives signal a new attitude of cooperation between the two
major emitters that could bode well for global progress.
The US has also played a more constructive role in recent international climate
negotiations, at least in certain respects.87 Countries have pledged to create a new
overarching climate agreement by 2015, which looks to be structured around
nationally determined emissions reductions targets.88 In the latest negotiations, in
November 2013 in Warsaw (Poland), the US negotiators pushed hard for developed
and developing countries alike to be required to submit country-level ‘commitments’.89
The proposal met with resistance from the major developing country emitters, but
ultimately won agreement after the word ‘commitment’ was changed to ‘contribution’ in
the negotiated text.90 While the details of these future contributions remain vague, this
non-differentiation among countries is a critical step in securing sufﬁciently ambitious
pledges to have a ﬁghting chance of keeping climate change to reasonable levels.

6.

conclusion

If President Obama brings to fruition his Climate Action Plan and the courts uphold
the ensuing regulations, the US will achieve its 2009 ‘Copenhagen pledge’ to lower
emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020.91 Given that the 2009 pledge was made
at a time when congressional action seemed imminent, it would be no small feat to
achieve this same result through executive action alone (even with the aid of low
natural gas prices). Ultimately, however, this level of reduction is very small relative
to what is needed. At the same time that we have chosen to rely on country-level
‘contributions’ driven by domestic realities as the framework for a new international
mechanism, recent analyses suggest two sobering facts. Firstly, the ambition reﬂected
in current country-level pledges is far too low to keep us below the internationally
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agreed target of two degrees Celsius of global warming.92 Secondly, even two degrees
of warming may be more than the planet can bear without disastrous consequences.93
Thus, while the climate change commitments of the Obama administration’s second-term
are laudable, real progress will require leveraging them into something bigger and bolder
both at home and abroad.
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